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INTRODUCTION

The dispute at bar arises from the conduct of Provident Life and Accident Insurance

~.

Company ("Provident") in denying Dawneen Wirtz' s claim for life insurance benefits.
Mrs. W1rtz purchased a life insurance policy insuring the life of her then-husband Keith
Wirtz and naming herself beneficiary. Over 25 years, Mrs. Wirtz paid all premiums and
maintained the policy in force. After the death of Mr. Wirtz, Mrs. Wirtz submitted a claim
for the benefits owing to her, but Provident denied the claim, asserting that Mrs. Wirtz, as
an ex-spouse, had been disqualified as beneficiary pursuant to Utah Code §75-2-804(2).
However, under Utah law, this revocation procedure did not apply to life insurance

~

contracts nor to benefits that an ex-spouse appoints to herself. Provident denied the claim
in bad faith.
Thereafter, Provident filed an interpleader action, bringing Mr. Wirtz's second wife,
Margene, and his estate, into the illegitimate dispute. Provident thus subjected Mrs. Wirtz
to three years of delay and the great cost and trouble of litigation before she was able, in the
end, to recover a part, but only a part, of the benefits owing to her.
At the time Provident filed the interpleader, Mrs. Wirtz counterclaimed for breach
of contract, bad faith, and for tortious conduct by Provident. Provident moved for
summary judgment of Mrs. Wirtz' s counterclaims and for discharge from all liability
beyond the interpleaded funds, which the court granted, stating that there was no evidence
that Provident had acted negligently or in bad faith.
The Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's order granting summary
5
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judgment and discharge and allow Mrs. Wirtz to pursue her remedies, since Utah Code
(y)

§3 lA-22-413 establishes that the beneficiary revocation provision of §75-2-804(2) does
not apply to life insurance policies; also by its plain terms, §75-2-804(2) does not apply to
benefits that an ex-spouse appoints to herself.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment and discharge to Provident,
where Utah Code §3 lA-22-413 establishes that Utah Code §75-2-804(2) does not revoke
an ex-spouse's beneficiary designation under a life insurance policy, and where
§75-2-804(2), by its plain terms, does not apply to benefits that an ex-spouse appoints to
herself?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"An appellate court reviews a [district] court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant
or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable

@

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v.

Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,I 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment should be granted only "if the moving party shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." iDrive Logistics v. IntegraCore, 2018 UT App 40.
CITATION OF ISSUE-REVIEW PRESERVATION
The issue on appeal is preserved for review as evidenced at Addenda 1, R. 522-529.

6
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

On September 29, 1989 an agent of Provident Life and Accident Insurance

Company ("Provident") came to Dawneen Wirtz's work place and offered her life
insurance products.
2.

See, R. 430, Declaration ofDawnnen G. Wirtz, if 2.

Dawneen Wirtz wanted to be able to provide financial support that would be

missing to her children in the event her husband died. R. 431, if 3.
3.

The Provident agent informed Dawneen Wirtz that she could buy a policy

that would insure the life of her husband and make her beneficiary, in the event of his
death. R. 431, if 4.
4.

~

Dawneen Wirtz purchased $75,000 oflife insurance and completed and

signed, as the proposed insured, Provident' s form app~ication, insuring the life of her
~

husband, Keith T. Wirtz, and designating herself beneficiary. R. 427-428, R. 431, ilil 5, 7.
5.

Dawneen Wirtz alone paid all premiums for the life insurance policy (the

"Policy") and maintained it in full force from January 1, 1990 through the date of Keith
Wirtz's death, on January 3, 2015. R. 431, if 8, R. 524, if 5.
6.

Dawneen Wirtz is the owner of the Policy. R. 431, if 10; R. 416, if 3.

7.

At no time during the life of the Policy, did Dawneen Wirtz ever

request or submit any change of ownership or beneficiary of the Policy. R. 431, ,r 11.
8.

Provident admits that it issued the Policy to Dawneen Wirtz, that the Policy

was in force at the time of Keith T. Wirtz's death, and that benefits are payable pursuant to

7
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the terms and conditions of the Policy and Utah law. R. 416-417, ,r,r 4, 6.
9.

Dawneen Wirtz submitted a claim for benefits to Provident under the Policy

on January 23, 2015. R. 254, ,r 8.
10.

On July 23, 2015 Provident denied Mrs. Wirtz's claim on the assertion that

her beneficiary status had been revoked pursuant to Utah Code§ 75-2-804. R. 256, ,r 21,
R. 525-526, ,r,r 13, 16, 17.
11.

On January 5, 2016 Provident filed an interpleader action, naming Dawneen

Wirtz, Margene Wirtz (Keith Wirtz's second wife), and the Estate of Keith T. Wirtz as
(;j

defendants, thereby creating a dispute over the proceeds between these entities. R.
526-527, ,r 18, ,r 9.
12.

Dawneen Wirtz counterclaimed against Provident for breach of contract, bad

faith, negligence, misrepresentation, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. R. 527, ,r 8.
13.

On June 15, 2016 Provident moved for discharge and for summary judgment

of Mrs. Wirtz's counterclaims, which the trial court granted on December 19, 2016
iJJ

Addenda 1, R. 522-529.
14.

After more than another year of litigation, trial on ownership of the

interpleaded funds was set for March 13-14, 2018. R. 600-602.
@

15.

On February 14, 2018 Defendants Margene Wirtz and Estate of Keith T.

Wirtz filed their Response to Court's Questions, acknowledging no execution of a

8
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governing instrument by Keith T. Wirtz and acknowledging case law favoring Dawneen
Wirtz's claim to the life insurance benefits. R. 664-666.
16.

Thereafter, the interpleaded parties agreed to a settlement and on February

19, 2018 jointly moved for Disbursement oflnterpleaded Funds and Dismissal of the
Interpleader Action with Prejudice. R. 671-672.
17.

On February 20, 2018 the trial court entered Order for Disbursement of

Interpleaded Funds and dismissal of the Case with Prejudice. R. 680-681.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I

Provident acted in bad faith, as a matter oflaw, by denying Dawneen G. Wirtz's
claim for benefits as the designated beneficiary of her life insurance contract with
Provident. Provident, as insurer, owed Mrs. Wirtz the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
including to diligently investigate, fairly evaluate, and act reasonably. Provident
breached this duty by disregarding Utah law which established that Mrs. Wirtz's
beneficiary status was not revoked, since she was the designated beneficiary of a life
insurance policy and since she had appointed benefits to herself. The trial court
committed prejudicial error in dismissing Mrs. Wirtz's remedies for Provident's wrongful
conduct.
POINT II

The trial court also erred in discharging Provident because Provident could have no
reasonable belief that it was or could be exposed to double or multiple liability. The Utah
9
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~

Code established that Mrs. Wirtz, as the designated beneficiary, was alone entitled to the
~

benefits of her life insurance contract with Provident.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PROVIDENT ACTED IN BAD FAITH AS A MATTER OF LAW.
MRS. WIRTZ'S CAUSES OF ACTION ARE LEGALLY VIABLE.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Mrs. Wirtz's
counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
negligence, misrepresentation, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court's only stated grounds for dismissal were that "[e]ach of these counterclaims
is predicated on Dawneen's allegation that provident acted negligently and/or in bad faith

0a

when it initially denied her claim", and that Dawneen had not alleged any satisfactory
negligent conduct by Provident;
Rather, Dawneen simply disagrees with Provident's interpretation of
Utah Code§ 75-2-804(2)- including whether it applies when the
ex-spouse applied for the life insurance policy, signed the application
as the insured, and paid all of the premiums - and Provident's
decision to interplead the proceeds under rule 22 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Court concludes that in the absence of specific facts that would
support an inference that Provident's initial denial of her claim or its
decision to file this interpleader action was made in bad faith,
Dawneen's counterclaims fail as a matter of law. Indeed, if the Court
determines that the statute applies, Provident cannot be liable for
following it and denying her claim. If the Court determines that the
statute does not apply, then the proceeds will be paid to Dawneen.

vi

Addenda 1, R. 527-528, ,r,r 8, 9-11, 13. However, rather than "fail as a matter oflaw" for
10
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lack of inference of bad faith, Mrs. Wirtz's counterclaims should have survived and
succeeded as a matter of law, since Utah law dictates that Provident acted in bad faith by

~

denying Mrs. Wirtz's claim.
In Utah, the parties to an insurance contract owe each other a duty of good faith and
fair dealing. See, Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798, 801-802
(Utah 1985). In Beck, the Utah Supreme Court stated,
[W]e hold that the good faith duty to bargain or settle under an
insurance contract is only one aspect of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in all contracts and that a violation of that duty gives
rise to a claim for breach of contract. ...
We further hold that as parties to a contract, the insured and the
insurer have parallel obligations to perform the contract in good faith,
obligations that inhere in every contractual relationship ....
[W]e conclude that the implied obligation of good faith performance
contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently
investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid,
will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and
reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. . . . The duty of good
faith also requires the insurer to "deal with laymen as laymen and not
as experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting" and to refrain
from actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits
of the contract. . . . These performances are the essence of what the
insured has bargained and paid for, and the insurer has the obligation
to perform them. When an insurer has breached this duty, it is liable
for damages suffered in consequence of that breach.

Beck, at 795, 798, 801-802 (Utah 1985). (emphasis added).
Having entered into an insurance contract with Mrs. Wirtz, Provident owed her
duties of good faith and fair dealing, including to diligently investigate, fairly evaluate, and
11
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~

act reasonably. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Provident failed in these duties and
~

committed bad faith as a matter of law, by disregarding Utah law which establishes that
Utah Code Code § 75-2-408(2) did not apply to life-insurance-beneficiary designations. 1

See, Utah Code §§ 75-2-804(2)(a)(i) and 3 lA-22-413. The heading to § 75-2-804 states,
"No revocation of life insurance beneficiary".

added).

See, Addenda 2, R. 715 (emphasis

§ 3 lA-22-413 of the Insurance Code, which addresses life insurance policies and

beneficiary designations, states:

(i@

Notwithstanding Section 75-2-804, the insurer discharges its
obligation under the insurance policy or certificate ofinsurance if it
pays the properly designated beneficiary ... .2

Utah Code § 31A-22-4 l 3(2)(a). (emphasis added).
Thus, under Utah law, the revocation procedure of Utah Code§ 75-2-804 does not
apply to life-insurance-beneficiary designations. Under Utah Code§ 31A-22-413(2)(a),
discharge of Provident' s good faith duties of diligent investigation, fair evaluation, and
reasonable action required payment of the claimed benefits to Dawneen Wirtz, the properly
designated beneficiary. Provident committed bad faith as a matter of law by disregarding

I It is inconsequential to the issue at bar whether Provident acte~ willfully or simply failed
to perform its due diligence: "From a practical standpoint, the state of mind of the insurer is
irrelevant; even an inadvertent breach of the covenant of good faith implied in an insurance
contract can substantially harm the insured and warrants a remedy." Beck, at 800.
2 The statute goes on to state that an insurer does not have to pay the named beneficiary
where it has "actual notice" of an assignment or a change in beneficiary designation,
neither of which occurred in the case at bar. See, Utah Code§ 31A-22-413.
12
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Utah law and denying Mrs. Wirtz's claim. The trial court then committed prejudicial
error by dismissing Mrs. Wirtz's counterclaims, denying her remedy for the harm
occasioned by Provident. That harm includes the delay, costs, and stress of three years of
unnecessary litigation and only partial recovery of her contracted benefits. The Utah
Court of Appeals should, therefore, reverse the trial court's dismissal of Mrs. Wirtz's
counterclaims.
In addition to the Utah Code's explicit exemption oflife-insurance-beneficiary
designations, the plain terms of§ 75-2-804(2) also do not apply to Mrs. Wirtz's
designation. In the case at bar, there was no appointment of benefits from one spouse to
another in a governing instrument, rather, Mrs. Wirtz appointed the benefits of the life
insurance policy she purchased, to herself. § 75-2-804(2) states,
(2) Except as provided by the express terms of a governing
instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the
marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after
the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a
mamage:
(a) Revokes any revocable:
(i)

Disposition or appointment ofpropertv made by a
divorced individual to the individual's former
spouse in a governing instrument and any
disposition or appointment created by law or in a
governing instrument to a relative of the divorced
individual's former spouse; ....

Addenda 2. Utah Code §75-2-804(2)(a)(i).

(emphasis added).

As stated, the statutory provision revokes only an appointment or disposition made
13
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by an individual to a former spouse in a governing instrument. In the matter at bar, no
such appointment was made. R. 664-666. Rather, Dawneen Wirtz made an appointment
of life insurance benefits to herself. 3 Thus, by its plain language, the statute does not
~

apply, and for this additional reason, Dawneen Wirtz's beneficiary status is not revoked.

4

Finally, Mrs. Wirtz also notes that the U.S. District Court for Utah has held that
Utah Code§ 75-2-804 did not apply to facts similar to the case at bar, where an ex-wife
paid all the premiums of the insurance policy and is, thus, the owner of the policy.

See,

Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Goates, 2013 WL 6383826 (2013 D.Utah).
For any and all of the above reasons, the trial court erred in summarily terminating
Mrs. Wirtz's counterclaims. This Court should reverse the trial court's order.
POINT II
PROVIDENT COULD HAVE NO REASONABLE BELIEF OF
EXPOSURE TO DOUBLE OR MULTIPLE LIABILITY.

Likewise, for the reasons set forth above, the trial court also committed prejudicial
error in discharging Provident from liability beyond the interpleaded funds. Rule 22,
"Interpleader" provides,
3 It is common knowledge in the life insurance industry that there are different kinds of
policies, including, for example, one where a husband purchases a policy on his own life to
protect his wife and children, and one where, as in the case at bar, a wife purchases a policy
on her husband's life and names herself beneficiary, to protect her family's financial
welfare in case he dies.
4 Of course, this only makes sense. Why would the law require that an individual forfeit
25 years of payments and contracted benefits appointed to self, just because of divorce?
There is no reason, and the law does not require it.
14
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Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as
defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that
the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability....
Rule 22, Utah R. Civ. P. The trial court ruled that Provident properly filed the interpleader
because it "reasonably believed that it may be subject to double or multiple liability
because the beneficiary designation may have been automatically revoked pursuant to
Utah Code§ 75-2-804(2)." Addenda 1, R. 527,I 6 (See also, ,I,I 4, 7, 13). However, as
demonstrated above, there was, as a matter of law, no revocation of Mrs. Wirtz's
beneficiary designation, since the statute does not apply to life-insurance-beneficiary
designations, nor to an appointment of benefits which Mrs. Wirtz made to herself.
Therefore, Provident could have no reasonable belief that it was or could be exposed to
double or multiple liability. The Utah Court of Appeals should, therefore, reverse the
order of the trial court discharging Provident from liability.
CONCLUSION

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment of Dawneen Wirtz' s
counterclaims and discharging Provident. As a matter of law, Provident acted in bad faith
by denying Mrs. Wirtz' s claim for her life insurance benefits, and Provident could have no
reasonable belief of exposure to double or multiple liability. Utah law established that
there was no revocation of Mrs. Wirtz's beneficiary designation.
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals
reverse the trial court's December 19, 2016 Order and restore Dawneen Wirtz's
counterclaims against Provident.
15
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ADDENDA

1.

Order Granting Interpleader Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, for
Discharge, and for Attorney fees and Costs. (entered December 19, 2016). R.
522-530.

2.

Utah Code Section 75-2-804.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 19 2016
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
Salt Lake County~
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ey: _ _ _ _ _=-oe-puty~ra~e""P'rk

PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING INTERPLEADER
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FOR
DISCHARGE, AND FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

vs.
DAWNEEN G. WIRTZ, MARGENE
TAYLOR WIRTZ, and THE ESTATE OF
KEITH T. WIRTZ,

Case No. 160900031
Defendants.
Judge Laura S. Scott
DAWNEEN G. WIRTZ,

December 19, 2016

Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.

PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Counterclaim Defendant.
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, for Discharge, and for Attorney's
Fees (Motion) filed by interpleader plaintiff Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company
(Provident).

The Motion was fully briefed by the parties and oral argument was held on

September 14, 2016.

01

Provident was represented by Clint R. Hansen of Fabian VanCott,

Defendant Dawneen G. Wirtz (Dawneen) was represented by Matthew H. Raty of the Law
Office of Matthew H. Raty, PC, and Defendants Margene Taylor Wirtz (Margene) and The
Estate of Keith T. Wirtz (Estate) were represented by David A. VanDyke of VanDyke Legal

I
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Services. 1 After considering the briefs, exhibits, applicable law, and arguments of counsel, the
Court issued its oral ruling granting the Motion at the conclusion of the hearing.
As directed by the Court, counsel for Provident prepared a proposed Order, which was
served on the other parties. Counsel for Margene and the Estate approved the Order as to form.
Dawneen filed an objection to the proposed Order. Provident filed a response to the objection.
The proposed Order was submitted for decision on November 21, 2016. After reviewing the
parties' submissions, the Court hereby enters the following Order on the Motion:

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

ijµ

For purposes of the Motion, the following material facts are undisputed:

1.

On September 29, 1989, an agent of Provident came to Dawneen's work and

offered her life insurance products. Dawneen alleges the agent told her that she could buy a life
insurance policy that would insure the life of her husband and make her the beneficiary of the
policy in the event of his death. Dawneen alleges the agent also told her that "she was the owner
of the policy and that she would have to keep the premiums current to maintain the policy."
2.

That same day, Dawneen signed an application for a life insurance policy to

Provident. The application identified "Keith T. Wirtz" as the proposed insured and "Dawneen
Wirtz, wife" as the beneficiary. Dawneen signed the application as the proposed insured.
3.

On January 1, 1990, Provident issued policy number U29001795 in the base

amount of$75,000.
4.

On August 28, 1990, Dawneen and Keith were divorced. Keith married Margene

on December 1, 1990 and they remained married until his death on January 3, 2015.
1

Because they share the same last name and to avoid confusion, the Court will refer to the parties as Dawneen,

Margene, and Keith. No disrespect to the parties is intended.
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5.

From January 1, 1990 through January 3, 2015, the date of Keith's death,

Dawneen paid all the premiums for the policy.
6.

On or about January 23, 2015, Dawneen submitted a Claimant's Statement, a

copy of Keith's death certificate, and a copy of the group term certificate to Provident. In the
relationship to the deceased section of the Claimant's Statement, Dawneen identified herself as
"ex-wife."
7.

On or about February 3, 2015, Provident sent a letter to Dawneen requesting

additional information that it needed to continue its review. The letter stated:
The State of Utah has certain laws that mandate that the rights of a
spouse to the proceeds of a life insurance policy are terminated
. upon divorce, unless the divorce decree states the former spouse is
entitled to the proceeds, or the insured re-designates the former
spouse as beneficiary. Please provide a copy of the divorce decree
and property settlement or other proof that you are entitled to the
proceeds of this policy.

~

8.
9.

Dawneen did not respond to the February 3rd letter.
. On or about February 27, 2015, Provident sent a second letter to Dawneen

requesting the divorce decree and property settlement or other proof that she was entitled the
proceeds of the policy. Dawneen did not respond to the February 27 th letter.
10.

On or about March 10, 2015, Provident sent a third letter to Dawneen. On or

about April 2,·2015, Provident sent a fourth letter to Dawneen.
11.

On or about March 30, 2015, Dawneen sent a letter to Provident enclosing a copy

of the Decree of Divorce, the Order on Petition to Modify and Judgment, the life insurance
application, and pay stubs and cancelled checks showing that she had paid the premiums for the

policy. In the 'letter, Dawneen stated that there was no property settlement from the divorce, that

3
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~

the beneficiary designation was not changed after the divorce, and that she had paid the
premiums for 28 years in good faith. Neither the Decree of Divorce nor the Order on Petition to
Modify and Judgment mention life insurance or the policy.
12.

On April 16, 2015, Provident sent another letter to Dawneen requesting additional

infonnation it needed in order to continue its review. Specifically, Provident requested a copy of
''the Property Settlement Agreement that provides proof that you are entitled to the proceeds of
this policy."

13.

On July 23, 2015, Provident sent a letter to Dawneen, which states in relevant part

as follows:
Unfortunately, it appears that your designation as beneficiary of
· this policy has been revoked by statute. Under the Utah Probate
Code, the designation of a spouse as beneficiary of a life insurance
policy is revoked upon divorce of the spouses.
Should you wish to provide any additional information that may
support your entitlement, please provide this to us within 20 days
from the date of this letter.
· The Company's decision is based on the information in our file ...
If you have additional information that you believe may affect our
decision, please forward it to us for review.
If additional information is provided, we expressly reserve our
rights to continue the review of the claim. We will promptly
review and evaluate the claim upon receipt of the required
documents ...
14.

During this period of time, Provident's internal records identified Keith as the

"owner" of the policy.
15.

Also during this period of time, Provident was unable to locate the actual group

master policy and assembled a specimen group insurance policy, which it provided to Dawneen.
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16.

. On August 10, 2015, counsel for Dawneen sent a letter to Provident, which states

in relevant part as follows:
I note that you have not provided a citation of section or subsection
of the Utah Probate Code in support of your assertion. My initial
review demonstrates that there is no basis to deny Mrs. Wirtz
[Dawneen] the benefits of the contract she has with your company,
· a contract for which she alone paid premiums for 27 years. Please
set forth, promptly, the complete basis of your assertion that Mrs.
Wirtz's beneficiary designation is revoked.
17.

On September 8, 2015, Provident sent a letter to counsel for Dawneen, which

states in relevant part as follows:

· In your recent correspondence, you requested the specific statute
on which our denial was based. We based this infonnation on
Utah Probate Code statute 75-2-804. The Company's decision is
based on the information in our file ... If you have additional
information that you believe may affect our decision, please
forward it to us for review ...
18.
~

·

On January 5, 2016, Provident filed this interpleader action and interpleaded the

$75,000 with the Court. Provident named and served Margene and the Estate as defendants.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the above undisputed material facts, the Court makes the following conclusions

(jj

of law:
1.

The only issue addressed in this Order is whether Provident properly interpleaded

the $75,000 proceeds from the life insurance policy and whether Dawneen's counterclaims
against Provident should be dismissed.
2.

. While both parties agree that Keith was the insured and that Dawneen was the

designated beneficiary under the policy, there is a material· dispute regarding ownership of the
policy, which the court does not resolve at this time.

s
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3.

Rule 22 of the Utah Rule~ of Civil Procedure provides that "[p]ersons having

claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and be required to interplead when their
claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability."
4.

· The Court concludes that Provident properly filed this interpleader action and

interpleaded the proceeds because it reasonably believed that it may be exposed to double or
multiple liability.

5.

Although Dawneen alleges that it is clear under Utah Code § 75-2-804(2) and the

life insurance application that she is the owner of the policy and therefore the only one entitled to
the proceeds, the Court does not find that such a conclusion was clear based on the information
that was available to Provident at the time it issued its denial.
6.

Based on its review of the documentation provided by Dawneen, Provident

reasonably beiieved that it may be subject to double or multiple liability because the beneficiary
designation may have been automatically revoked pursuant to Utah Code§ 75-2-804(2).

7.

Because its filing of this interpleader action was permissible, Provident is entitled

to be discharged from this case as a matter of law.
8.

Dawneen asserts counterclaims against Provident for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, conversion, misrepresentation, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

9.

Each of these counterclaims is predicated on Dawneen's allegation that Provident

acted negligently and/or in bad faith when it initially denied her claim and then filed this
interpleader action, thereby creating the present dispute with Margene and the Estate, who did
not know about the policy or pay any of the premiwns for the policy.

6
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10.

Dawneen cites Lee v. West Coast, 688 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) as support for her

counterclaims. However, the Court finds that this case is distinguishable. In West Coast, the
insurance company negligently failed to have the proper owner sign the change of beneficiary
fonn. Dawneen does not allege any similar negligent conduct by Provident.
11.

Rather, Dawneen simply disagrees with Provident's interpretation of Utah Code

§ 75-2-804(2) - including whether it applies when the ex-spouse applied for the life insurance
policy, signed the application as the insured, and paid all of the premiums - and Provident's
decision to interplead the proceeds under rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
12.

Moreover, once Provident decided to file an interpleader action, it was required to

notify all parties with a potential interest in the proceeds, including Margene and the Estate.

13.

The Court concludes that in the absence of specific facts that would support an

inference that Provident' s initial denial of her claim or its decision to file this interpleader action
was made in bad faith, Dawneen's counterclaims fail as a matter of law. Indeed, if the Court
detennines that the statute applies, Provident cannot be liable for following it and denying her
claim. If the Court determines that the statute does not apply, then the proceeds will be paid to
Dawneen.
14.

With respect to Provident's request for attorney fees and costs, Dawneen does not

dispute that an interpleader is generally entitled to reasonable attorney fees related to the filing of
the interpleader action.

Although there may be_ circumstances where an interpleader is not

entitled to attorney fees, such circumstances are not present in this case.

2

2

See Capson v. Bisbois, 592 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1979) (attorney fees and costs may denied when interpleader did
not act as a disinterested stakeholder or when the interpleader, through its own fault, created the conflicting claims).
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15.

More specifically, Provident did not, through its own fault, cause the conflicting

claims necessitating the filing of this interpleader action. Nor has Provident been an active
participant in the litigation or taken a position on the merits.
16.

. Thus, the Court awards Provident reasonable attorney fees and costs related to the

filing of this action, which will be determined after Provident serves an affidavit of attorney fees
and costs on Dawneen, who will be given an opportunity to challenge the amount of the
requested fees and costs. 3
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Dawneen Wirtz's counterclaims against Provident
are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
A.

Provident is dismissed as a party to the case and discharged from liability for the

interpleaded funds.
B.

Provident is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs related to the filing

of this action, which may be paid from the interpleaded funds which are currently on deposit
with the Court at the conclusion of this action.
Dated this

.fl!_day of December, 2016.

3

Dawneen argues that Provident is not entitled to costs because the Court did not specifically reference costs in its
oral ruling. While true, the case law relied on by both parties state that an interpleader is entitled to both attorney
fees and costs.

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00529

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 160900031 by the method and on the date specified.
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL
MANUAL

EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

CLINT R
SCOTT M
MATTHEW
DAVID A

HANSEN chansen@fabianvancott.com
PETERSEN spetersen@fabianvancott.com
H RATY mraty@ratylaw.com
VAN DYKE dave@vandykelegal.com

12/19/2016

/s/ EMILY AGUILAR-CUESTA

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

~

Printed: 12/19/16 15:03:49

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ti)

ADDENDA 2

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

75-2-804

INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS

relating to effect of divorce, annulment, and
decree of separation, and enacts the present
section, effective July 1, 1998.
Amendment Notes.
.
The '2006 amendment, effective May 1, 2006;
added Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(d); substituted

75-2-804

variations of "commits a disqualifying homicide" for "feloniously and intentionally kills" or
similar phrases in Subsections (2), (3), and
(S)(a); substituted "one who kills" for "a killer"
twice in Subsection (p); rewrote Subsection (7);
and made stylistic changes.

75-2-804. Definitions ~ Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by divorce - Effect of severance - Revival - Protection of
and bona fide purchasers onal liability of recipient o
r
. changes of circumstances - No r~vc;>c,a tion of life-insurance beneficiary.

n
or
g
if
C-

e

of

s-

(1)

(a) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item
of property ,or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing
instrument.
(b) "Divorce or annulment" means any divorce or annulment,. or any
dissolution or declaration of invalidity of a marriage, that would exclude the
spouse as ·a surviving spouse within the meaning of Section 75-2-802. A
decree of separation that does not terminate the status of husband and wife
is not a divorce for purposes of this section.
(c) "Divorced individual" includes an individual whose marriage has been
annulled.
(d) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by
the 9-ivorced individual before the-divorce or annulment of the individual's
marriage to the individual's former spouse.
(e) "Relative of the divorced individual's former spouse" means an individual, who is. related to the divorced individual's former spouse by blood,
adoption, or affinity and who, .after the divorce or annulment, is not related
to the divorced individual by blood, adoption, or affinity. .
(0 "Revocable," with respect to a disposition; appointment, provision, or
nomi~ation, I.11eans one lmder which .the divorced individual, .a t the time of
the divorce or annulment, was alone empowered, by law or under the
governing instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of the individual's
former sppuse or former spouse's relative, wh~ther or not the divorced
individual. was .then empowered to designate another. in place of the
individual's former spouse or in place of the individual's former spouse's
relative and whether or not the divorced individual then had the capacity to
exercise the-power.
.
(2) Except as ·provided by the-express terms of a governing instrument, a
court or,der, or a contract relating to the -division of the marital estate made
between the di~orced indiy_id~als before or after the _m arriage, divorce, or
annulment, .t he divorce or annulment of a marriage:
(a) revokes any revocable:
Ci). disposition or appointment of property maµe by a divorced individual
to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument and any
71
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disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to
a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse;
(ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the divorced individual's former spouse or
on a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse; and
(iii) nomination in a governing instrument, which nominates a divorced
individual's former spouse or a relative of the divorced individual's former
spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a
personal representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardia~ md
.
(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at
the time of the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with' the right of
survivorship, transforming the interests of the former spo1.1ses into tenancies
in common.
(3) A severance under Subsection (2)(b) does not affect any third-party
interest in property acquired for value md in good faith reliance on an
apparent title by survivorship in the_survivor of the former spouses unless a
writing declaring the severance has b~t3n noted, registered, filed, or recorded in
records appropriate fo the kind and location of -the property, which are-relied
upon;_ . in the ordinary course of transactions involving such property, as
evidehce of ownership.
(4) Provisions of a go':'erni"ng instrument ¥e ·given effect -as if th~ (ox~er
spouse and_r.efatives of the former spouse disclaimed all provisions revoked-by
this sectio~, or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or
representative capacity, as if the former spouse and relatives of the former
spouse.died immediately before the divorce or annulment.
(5) Provisions revoked solely by this section are revived by the divorced
individual's remarria_ge td the former spouse or by a nullification of the divorce
or annulment.
.
(6) No change of circumstances other than as described in this section and
in Section 75-2-803 effects a revocation.
(7)(a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made .a payment
or transferred an item of property or any other. benefit to a beneficiary
designated in a governing instrument affected by a divorce, annulment, or
remarriage, or for having taken any other action in good faith reliance on the
· validity of the governing instrument, before the payor or other third party
.received written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage. A payor or · ·
other third party is liable for a payment made or other action taken after the
payor or other third party received written notice of a claimed forfeiture or
revocation under this section.
(b) Written notice of the divorce, annulmen"t, or remarriage under Subsection (7){a) shall be mailed to--the payor's or other third party's main office
or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or served
upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a
civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of the divorce, annulment, or
remarriage, a payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or
72
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transfer or deposit.any item of property held by it to or with the court having
juri_sdiction ofthe_prohate proce·e dings relating to the decedent's estate or, if
no proceedings have been: commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estates located in the
county of the decedent's resid,ence::The court shall hold the funds or item of
property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance with the determination. Payments,
transfers, or deposits inade to br with the court discharge the payor or other
third 'p arty from all clailris for the value of amounts paid to or items of
property transferred to or deposited with the court.
(8)(a) A person who purchases property from a former spouse, relative of a
former spq4-se, or any other person for vahie and without notice, or who
receives from ·a former ~pouse, relative of, a form~r spouse, or any other
person a p·ayment or _o ther\ item of property in partial or full satisfaction of
a i~gally enforceable obliglltion, is ne_ither obligated unq_e r this section to
return the payment, item of property, or benefit, nor is liable under this
section for the amount of the payment or the value of the.item of property or
benefit. But a former spouse, relative of former sp~~se, or .other person
who, not for value,.received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit
to which that person is not,entitled unger this section is obligated to return
the payment, item -of property, or l;>enefit, or is personally liable for the
amount oftheimyment or the value oftD.e item of property or benefit, tc;> the
person who is entitled to it under this section.
(b) If this section or any part of this -section is preempted by federal law
with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered
by this section, a former spouse, relative of the former spouse, or any other
person who, not for value, received a ·paymeht, item of property, or any other
benefit to which that person is not entitled under this section is obligated to
return that payment, item of property,
benefit, or is personally liable for
the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to
the person who would have been :entitled to it were this section or part of this
section not preem~ted.

a

or

HISTORY:
C. 1953, 75-2-804, enacted by.L. 1998, ch. 39,
§ 84; 2013, ch. 264, § 3.

cession, wills, joint assets, life insurance and
·beneficiary designations, and enacts the present section, effective July 1, 1998.

Repeals and ·Reenactments.
La\VS 1998, ch. 39, § 84 repeals former . §
75-2-804, as enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 3,
relating to effect of homicide on intestate sue-

Amendment Notes.
The 2013 amendment, effect ive May 14,
2013, substituted "another" for "himself' in
(1)(0 and made stylistic changes.

'

...

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Contracts Clause addresses contracts, not
donative transfers; because no contractual obligation is impaired by the revocation-upondivorce provision of this section, there is no

Analysis
Constitutionality.
Effect of divorce.
Retroactivity.
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